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Dian Abdul Hamed Shah and Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani
Malaysia takes great pride in being a melting pot of  different cultures, races and religions, 
co-existing under the purportedly “moderate Islamic nation” model. Yet, populations 
remain divided along racial and religious lines. Race and religion are not only politically 
salient; they are also jealously guarded to protect inter-ethnic sensitivities. Nevertheless, the 
vibrant development of  human rights awareness and advocacy introduced an additional 
element into the dynamics of  pluralism in Malaysia.  Human rights have become standard 
talking points even amongst those in the vanguard of  cultural, political, and religious 
conservatism. 
In Malaysia, cases invoking the right to religious freedom in the past decade have garnered 
widespread attention and caused considerable public uproar in the Muslim-majority 
nation. They involve (though not limited to) apostasy, child conversions, and persecution 
against non-mainstream religious doctrines. These cases raise pertinent questions about 
the parameters of  religious freedom for Muslims and non-Muslims alike, especially 
when pitted against particular religious rules, societal norms, as well as the bigger idea of  
collective social responsibility and national stability.
This paper offers a critical insight into the fundamental right to religious freedom in 
Malaysia. It examines several controversial cases which tackle the essential question of  
whether the Malaysian conception and practice of  religious freedom is consistent with 
international human rights standards and entrenched constitutional rights.  This paper 
demonstrates that while religious freedom is constitutionally guaranteed in Malaysia, 
there are other significant political, legal, and social dimensions to its exercise. It is hoped 
that this piece will prompt further discourses in drawing an acceptable idea of  religious 
freedom informed by universal views of  human rights, whilst maintaining aspects of  
common cultural values.
* This chapter is an adaptation of  a recently published article in the North Carolina Journal 
of  International Law and Commercial Regulation. See Dian Abdul Hamed Shah and Mohd 
Azizuddin Mohd Sani, Freedom of  Religion in Malaysia: A Tangled Web of  Legal, Political, and 
Social Issues, 36 N. Carolina Journal of  International Law and Commercial Regulation 647 (2011).
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1. Introduction
Malaysia prides itself  in its recognition as a “moderate Islamic country” (Darshni, 2005). 
Through inter-communal compromises in drafting the post-colonial Federal Constitution 
(hereinafter “Constitution”) in 1956, drafters agreed to establish Islam as the religion of  
the Federation (Fernando, 2006: 253). This was “part of  a political settlement in return 
of  which the non-Malays would obtain citizenship and the right to education in their 
mother tongue” (Harding, 2010: 499). The constitutional grounding of  Islam however, 
does not affect the right of  non-Muslims to practice and profess their own religions 
(Abdullah, 2003: 119). Indeed, this is the central feature of  religious freedom in Malaysia 
as enshrined in Article 11 of  the Constitution.
Almost five decades later, the rise of  several high-profile cases invoking the right to 
religious liberty reveals serious problems regarding the parameters of  that right (Barry, 
2009: 409). In 2004, Lina Joy sought to change her religious status on her national identity 
card at the National Registry Department (NRD). Born a Muslim, Joy converted to 
Christianity and was baptized in 1998. The NRD refused her application in the absence 
of  an order from a Syariah court affirming her conversion (Barry, 2009: 410). Joy did 
not resort to the religious courts, but applied to the civil courts on the grounds that the 
denial to remove “Islam” from her identity card interfered with her right to practice the 
religion of  her choosing under the Constitution. Her appeals proceeded to the Federal 
Court - the highest court in the land - but Joy was unsuccessful (Barry, 2009: 409-410).
Needless to say, the Lina Joy case drew criticism from journalists, human rights lawyers, 
activists and organizations. But it was only one of  the many cases questioning the extent 
of  religious freedom in Malaysia. The landmark ruling was expected to permanently 
settle questions of  whether Malaysia “will go down the line of  secular constitutionalism 
or whether that constitution will now be read subject to religious requirements” (Prystay, 
2006). Joy’s lawyer, Malik Imtiaz Sarwar – himself  a Muslim – sees the Federal Court 
verdict as “a potential dismantling of  Malaysia’s…multi-ethnic and multi-religious 
character” (Beech, 2007). Clearly, this case has many ramifications for the social, political 
and legal outlook in Malaysia. On the one hand, Joy’s case is seen as a grave violation of  a 
fundamental right enunciated in the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights (hereinafter 
“UDHR”) (1948). On the other, there is a fine distinction between freedom of  religion as 
understood in the UDHR, and a more limited, carefully crafted religious liberty provision 
in the Constitution. Thus, the extent to which the constitutional recognition of  freedom 
of  religion is consistent with the universal idea of  the same right is still a matter great of  
debate. This tension also demonstrates a broader theme: the tussle between universalist 
and relativist conceptions of  human rights.
The UDHR has evolved from an aspirational statement to a body of  norms accepted either 
as “part of  customary international law, or as an authoritative interpretation of  the UN 
Charter’s human rights provisions” (Steiner et al., 2008: 161).
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Its professed “universality” attracts much hullaballoo, especially from those resistant to 
these supposedly “Western ideas.” With the rise of  nationalism and claims of  “culture 
as national essence” (Merry, 2007: 527), human rights are challenged as a product of  
the individualistic, liberal West. Therefore, they are seen as inconsistent with communal, 
conservative or non-liberal values. For others, the idea of  a common standard of  
fundamental rights inherent to the virtue of  being human – rights, which are inalienable 
and indivisible regardless of  race, creed, and nationality – is a noble aspiration. Certainly 
today, the human rights movement has gone beyond mere idealism; it has transcended 
national boundaries, infiltrated international institutions, and embedded itself  in the 
world’s modern consciousness (UN General Assembly, 2009).  
In multicultural and multi-religious Malaysia, disputes on matters of  religion and race 
are only expected. But the extent to which the constitutional recognition of  freedom of  
religion is consistent with the universal idea of  the same right is still a matter great of  
debate. With the rise of  high-profile cases implicating religious freedom, this issue has 
been brought to the forefront of  the social, legal and political systems. In an attempt 
to address these, this article will proceed in four parts. Part 2 explains the international 
human rights conception of  the freedom of  thought, conscience and religion, and the 
two competing perspectives on the issue, namely the universalist and relativist debate. 
Part 3 underlines related provisions of  the Constitution and some historical background 
as to how Malaysia’s forefathers envisioned those crucial constitutional provisions. Part 
4 examines recent cases with regard to the Malaysian experience in dealing with freedom 
of  religion issues. Finally, Part 5 evaluates the issues shaping the extent of  freedom of  
religion in Malaysia and attempts to propose a way forward, especially in context of  the 
universalist-relativist arguments on that freedom. This paper will demonstrate that the 
parameters of  freedom of  religion in Malaysia are shaped by various political and legal 
forces, as well as the desire to maintain stability among the racially and religiously diverse 
population.
2. International Standards on Religious Freedom: Theories and 
 Perspectives
2.1 International Human Rights Instruments
The post-World War II promulgation of  the UDHR seeks to establish a foundational 
document that would transcend national boundaries and protect rights that are 
fundamental to a human being (Flowers, 1998). Religion is one of  those rights. Article 
18 of  the UDHR (1948) provides the right of  every individual to freedom of  thought, 
conscience and religion. This is a truly broad provision, one that envisions not only 
the right to manifest, practice and profess a religion, but also the right to change one’s 
religion. Meanwhile, Article 29(2) of  the UDHR (1948) permits limitations to the exercise 
of  one’s rights and freedoms “solely for the purpose of  securing due recognition and 
78
Dian Abdul Hamed Shah 
and Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani
respect for the rights and freedoms of  others and of  meeting the just requirements of  
morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.” 
Armed with the promise of  respect for pluralism, equality, and non-discrimination, 
successive documents built upon and cemented the UDHR’s provisions. For instance, 
Article 18(2) of  the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
prohibits coercion that would impair people’s freedom to choose their religion or belief. 
This right, however, is not absolute. Article 18(3) of  the ICCPR allows limitations on 
manifestations of  religious beliefs that are “prescribed by law and are necessary to protect 
public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of  others.” 
Thus, according to the Human Rights Committee (hereinafter “HRC”), Article 18 “does 
not permit any limitations whatsoever on the freedom of  thought and conscience or on 
the freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief  of  one’s choice” (UN Human Rights 
Committee, 1993). The HRC also states that “limitations may be applied only for those 
purposes for which they were prescribed and must be directly related and proportionate 
to the specific need on which they are predicated” (UN Human Rights Committee, 1993). 
The 1981 UN Declaration on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Intolerance and of  
Discrimination Based on Religion or Beliefs (hereinafter “1981 Declaration”) also refines 
the parameters of  religious freedom. One striking provision is Article 2’s prohibition on 
discrimination on the basis of  religion or other beliefs. It also defines the right of  parents 
or legal guardians of  a child “to organize the life within the family in accordance with 
their religion or belief.”
2.2 The Universalist Position
The key feature of  the UDHR (1948), or any of  the subsequent human rights instruments, 
is their universal aspirations, both in nature and application. The UDHR preamble 
evidences this when it speaks of  the “inherent dignity and of  the equal and inalienable 
rights of  all members of  the human family” and proclaims “a common standard of  
achievement for all people and all nations.” Similarly, the 1981 Declaration proclaims the 
“universal respect for and observance of  human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, 
without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.” 
It is obvious that the language of  these human rights instruments does not contemplate 
any differences by way of  background, creed, or geographical locations.  They address all 
regions and states, regardless of  the form of  government, socio-economic situation or 
religious-cultural traditions (Steiner et al., 2008: 517). However, in terms of  application, 
what ‘universal’ entails is a more complex question. Does this imply that all rights are to be 
conceived and implemented in the same manner everywhere? There are different schools 
of  thought on what ‘universalism’ involves (Donnelly, 1984: 400), but the underlying 
belief  of  the universal movement is that the basic values and concepts underlying human 
rights are common to all people. It is certainly perplexing to imagine a situation where 
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rights are protected and afforded in one region and not another. As Higgins argues, 
“human rights are human rights and not dependent on the fact that states, or groupings 
of  states, may behave differently from each other so far as their politics, economic policy, 
and culture are concerned” (Higgins, 2008: 539). 
But a deeper reflection of  this idea may expose inherent dangers. For instance, Jack 
Donnelly flags the problem of  moral imperialism, especially given radical universalists’ 
prioritizations of  the “demands of  the cosmopolitan moral community over all other 
(“lower”) moral communities” (Higgins, 2008: 539).
On the freedom of  religion, universalists claim that it is and must be the same everywhere, 
just like rights to equal protection, physical security, fair trials, free speech, and free 
association (Glendon, 2008: 142). Universal laws of  human rights apply to all regardless 
of  their religion, and states cannot deny the duties of  humanity on the mere basis of  
religious differences (Orakhelashvili, 2006: 316). The human rights movement insists 
on a non-theistic basis for the modern human rights regime, reflecting a “quest for 
universal acceptance and universal commitment to a common moral intuition articulated 
in specific agreed-upon terms” (Henkin, 1998: 234). For this reason, human rights are 
often dismissed as promoting highly individualistic and secular ideas which differ from 
prevailing religious and cultural norms and practices (Henkin, 1998: 233).
2.3 The Cultural Relativist Position
The relativist argument is based on the idea of  autonomy and self-determination 
(Donnelly, 1984: 400), both of  which are not unknown concepts to international law. 
Amongst the relativists, the Western Enlightenment foundations of  the human rights 
ideals (An-Naim, 2000: 96) render its validity to other cultures and regions questionable 
(Danchin, 2009: 95). They argue that the UDHR says very little about collective rights 
and is more directed towards a post-war human rights regime focused on individual 
rights (Danchin, 2009: 105). Relativists also consider it hard, if  not impossible, to 
translate human rights into cultures which emphasize the role of  the family and 
community living, particularly in cultures where religion (or religions) play an important 
role (Danchin, 2009: 118). Donnelly identifies different types of  cultural relativism, 
but argues that the relativists’ basic claim to human rights is grounded in respect for 
ethical and cultural diversity (Donnelly, 1984: 400-402). Rights and rules about morality 
depend on cultural contexts, and “culture” is used broadly to include not only indigenous 
traditions and customs, but also political and religious ideologies (Steiner et al., 2008: 
518).  For instance, Azizuddin Sani (2008: 2) argues that the Malaysian perspective of  
Asian Values, as propounded by former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, is based 
on Malay-Islamic culture and the conviction that Western conception of  rights can 
corrupt Malaysian culture and religious beliefs. Hence, on the basis that there are no 
trans-cultural ideas of  rights that can be agreed upon (Steiner et al., 2008: 518), we witness 
the emergence of  “Asian Values” and Islamic human rights.
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Relativists find great difficulty in reconciling universal rights with the differing ideas 
of  religious freedom (Henkin, 1998: 237). They also invoke the bigger idea of  social 
responsibility and national stability to defend practices that arguably contradict such 
freedom (Robertson, 1995). It is argued that ideas and morality of  religions differ from 
those of  human rights, not only in their sources of  authority, but also in their forms of  
expression and elements (Henkin, 1998: 230). 
The secular human rights doctrine is deemed contradictory to the fundamental tenets 
of  monotheistic religions because the former is based on individual autonomy and 
responsibility, as well as on systemic-rational principles, while the latter “is based on 
the subjection of  the individual and the community to the will of  God” (Raday, 2003: 
668). Different religions also claim their respective moral codes as the basis of  ethical, 
moral and social order, taking precedence over man-made laws and rights. The human 
rights corpus, underived from any holy texts or supreme higher order, is questioned 
by adherents who see themselves bound by the moral codes of  their respective faiths 
(Henkin, 1998: 233).  
Therefore, the UDHR is confronted with the question of  “how the right mediates 
between its purportedly secular and objective position, and the subjectivity of  particular 
religious norms” (Danchin, 2009: 96). The tension is evidenced by the concepts of  
religious duty and religious freedom, especially because in some religions there is a clear 
rejection of  at least some religious choice, condemnation of  apostasy, and resistance 
towards the proselytizing of  their constituents by other religions (Henkin, 1998: 231).
3. The Malaysian Constitutional law Framework
To conceptualize freedom of  religion in Malaysia, it is important to understand several 
provisions of  the Constitution.  First, although the Malaysian legal system models the 
Westminster system, it is often taken for granted that there is a written constitution in 
place. The Constitution, according to Article 4, is the supreme law of  the land. It is at 
the apex of  the legal hierarchy, so any acts of  parliament to the contrary may be deemed 
unconstitutional. Former Federal Judge Raja Azlan Shah’s account on constitutional 
supremacy in Loh Kooi Choon v. Gov’t of  Malaysia (1977) 2 MLJ 187 is particularly 
telling:
‘The Constitution . . . is the supreme law of  the land embodying 3 basic concepts: 
One of  them is that the individual has certain fundamental rights upon which not 
even the power of  the State may encroach . . .  no single man or body shall exercise 
complete sovereign power, but that it shall be distributed among the Executive, 
Legislative and Judicial branches of  the government’.
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3.1 Islam as Religion of  the Federation
Article 3(1) states that Islam shall be the religion of  the Federation, but other religions 
may be practiced in peace and harmony in the Federation. This provision is a product of  
inter-communal compromises reached in a pre-independence memorandum (hereinafter 
“Alliance memorandum”) constructed by the three main political parties in 1956 to 
safeguard the rights and interests of  all communities (Thomas, 2006: 17). 
Scholars have advanced various interpretations on Article 3, primarily connected to its 
ceremonial, historical and traditional significance (Thomas, 2006: 17; Fernando, 2006: 
249). For instance, L.A. Sheridan and Harry E. Groves (1987) argue that Article 3 entails 
the use of  Muslim rites in religious parts of  federal ceremonies (Sheridan and Groves, 
1987: 31; Thomas, 2006: 29). 
Thomas suggests that Article 3 gives due regard to the elements and traditions of  the 
Malay states long before the colonial period, i.e., the Sultanate, Islamic religion, Malay 
language, and Malay privilege (Thomas, 2006: 31). The constitutional ideas of  the Malay 
states stem from the Melaka Sultanate in the fifteenth century, where Buddhist, Hindu 
and Islamic influences permeated through the systems of  law and governance (Harding, 
1996: 5-6). Shad Saleem Faruqi (2006a: 1) stressed that “the implication of  adopting 
Islam as the religion of  the Federation is that Islamic education and way of  life can 
be promoted for Muslims. Islamic institutions can be established.  Islamic courts can 
be set up.  Muslims can be subjected to Syariah laws in certain areas provided by the 
Constitution.”
Historical evidence suggests that although the Alliance memorandum discussed Islam 
as a religion for Malaysia, it emphasized that this should not affect non-Muslims’ right 
to profess and practice their religion, and there is no implication that the State is not a 
secular State (Thomas, 2006: 18-19). Andrew Harding (2010: 506) suggests that despite 
the establishment of  Islam as the religion of  the Federation, it has always been agreed 
that this does not create an Islamic state, but simply allows for the religious nature of  state 
ceremonies. Chief  Justice Abdul Hamid, the Reid Commission member from Pakistan, 
also opined that the provision on Islam as the religion of  the State is innocuous (Thomas, 
2006: 19). However, “secular,” as intended by the founding fathers, does not connote 
an anti-religious or anti-Islamic state of  governance (Sarwar, 2007a). The Constitution 
envisages that Syariah laws would govern the personal law requirements of  Muslims, but 
it recognizes that the Syariah would not be made the supreme law. 
These views were espoused by the Supreme Court in the landmark case of  Che Omar bin 
Che Soh v. Public Prosecutor (1988) 2 MLJ 55, 55-56. In this case, the accused was faced with 
a mandatory death sentence for drug trafficking. He challenged the sentence on the basis 
that the imposition of  death penalty for the offence is contrary to Islamic injunction 
and therefore, unconstitutional and void. The Court reiterated the secular character 
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of  the law and governance system, which resulted from colonial Anglo/Malay treaties. 
It also emphasized that the British establishment of  secular institutions separated 
Islam into the public and private aspect. Islamic law “was rendered isolated in a narrow 
confinement of  the law of  marriage, divorce, and inheritance only”. Despite the foregoing 
arguments, it is notable that the establishment of  a particular religion over the State is not 
unique to Malaysia. In Norway, for instance, primacy on Christianity means that the king 
and a majority of  the cabinet are required to be members of  the state church (Shelton 
and Kiss, 2007: 575). In England, the Anglican Church remains at the center of  public 
policy and has substantial support from the state (Shelton and Kiss, 2007: 576).
3.2 Freedom of  Religion
Article 11 guarantees freedom of  religion, which – on its literal wording – seems 
comprehensive enough to safeguard this fundamental right for Malaysia’s plural society. 
A citizen has the right to profess, practice and – subject to Article 11(4) – to propagate 
his religion. 
Religious groups have the right to manage their own religious affairs or any matters 
relating to the properties and the establishment of  religious institutions. On its face, 
Article 11 does not expressly prohibit the conversion of  a Muslim, though at the same 
time it does not explicitly include the right to change one’s religion. However, it is 
suggested that Article 11 can be construed broadly to include one’s freedom to relinquish 
or change a religious belief  (albeit with limitations for Muslims under specific religious 
laws), and even to not be religious (Thomas, 2006: 34). 
The religious freedom clause is reinforced by other constitutional provisions. First, to 
combat subversion Article 149 permits the enactment of  laws which would otherwise 
be inconsistent with certain fundamental rights such as freedom of  speech or personal 
liberty, but it prohibits any encroachments on religious freedom. Second, under Article 
150 (6A), even in a state of  emergency, any emergency laws enacted thereafter cannot 
curtail freedom of  religion. Third, Article 8 prohibits discrimination on the grounds of  
religion against public sector employees, in the acquisition or holding of  property, and in 
any trade, business or profession. It is also important to note that freedom of  religion is 
not affected by Article 3’s establishment of  Islam as religion of  the Federation. Article 
3(4) clearly states that nothing in article 3 derogates from any other provision in the 
Constitution.
Even so, there are several restraints against freedom of  religion. Article 11(5) limits this 
freedom on grounds of  public order, public health or morality. Thus, any religious act 
deemed contrary to general laws relating to these grounds is unsustainable under Article 
11. In the case of  Muslim citizens, there may be additional restraints to religious freedom 
by virtue of  Schedule 9, List II, Item I of  the Constitution.  This grants power to State 
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Assemblies to enact laws to punish Muslims for offences against the precepts of  Islam, 
such as khalwat, adultery, apostasy, gambling, drinking and deviationist activities (Masum, 
2009: iii). 
A more controversial provision is subsection 4’s limitation on the propagation of  religion 
among Muslims. At first glance, it appears that this contradicts the idea of  religious 
freedom especially for those religions that regard proselytizing as a crucial part of  worship 
(Sheridan and Groves, 1987: 31). There are some important arguments against this view. 
First, laws controlling propagation are meant “to prevent Muslims from being exposed 
to heretical religious doctrines, be they of  Islamic or non-Islamic origin, and irrespective 
of  whether the propagators are Muslims or non-Muslims” (Masum, 2009: iii-iv). Shad 
Saleem Faruqi (2001) adds that such restrictions are meant to protect Muslims against 
organized international missionary activities and to preserve social harmony, rather than 
prioritizing any particular religion. Second, subsection 4 does not, in and of  itself, restrict 
propagation. Sheridan and Groves argue that it merely renders it constitutional for state 
law (or federal law in the case of  the Federal Territories) to control or restrict propagation 
(Sheridan and Groves, 1987: 76).
Case law has, to some extent, been instrumental in developing restraints on religious 
freedom. This is particularly true of  the word ‘practice’ in Article 11, culminating in 
the non-mandatory practices doctrine.  In essence, this means that freedom of  religion 
extends only to those practices and rituals that are essential and mandatory (Masum, 
2009: 4).
In Hjh Halimatussaadiah bte Hj Kamaruddin v. Public Services Commission, Malaysia & Another 
(1994) 3 MLJ 61 the court rejected a woman’s appeal to wear a purdah (a headdress 
covering a woman’s entire face except the eyes) to work because the government was 
entitled to forbid non-essential and optional religious traditions in the interests of  the 
public service. Similarly, in Meor Atiqulrahman bin Ishak & Others v Fatimah Sihi & Others 
(2006) 4 MLJ 605, 616  the court rejected demands by Muslim boys to be allowed to wear 
turbans to school.
4. The Malaysian Experience on Religious Freedom
Despite the constitutional grounding of  religious freedom, the exercise of  this right 
remains complicated in practice. The parameters of  freedom of  religion are not always 
clear, and it is often obscured by political, social and racial elements. The problem not 
only affects relations between Muslim and non-Muslim citizens; it raises many issues 
within the Muslim community itself.  This strikes a chord between those intent upon a 
modern liberal interpretation of  universal human rights principles, and those insistent on 
communally-based, constitutional-contract politics in Malaysia (Mohamad, 2008: 155). 
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4.1 Religious Conversions and Inter-faith Conflicts
In Malaysia, religious conversion cases raise multifaceted constitutional questions and 
human rights issues, primarily on the extent of  a citizen’s assertion of  the right to 
religious freedom. These cases also involve questions on the role of  Islam as religion of  
the Federation, specific Islamic rules on apostasy and the role of  Syariah courts, as well 
as one’s ethnic status. The most pertinent issue is whether the exercise of  this freedom 
includes the freedom of  Muslims to renounce the Islamic faith. The Malaysian courts 
have dealt with conversions and apostasy many times over the years, and the results are 
quite varied. For one, there is the notable case of  Soon Singh a/l Bikar Singh v. Pertubuhan 
Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM) & Anor. (1999) 1 MLJ 489, 489-502. Soon Singh was 
brought up as a Sikh but converted to Islam. He later renounced Islam and sought a 
declaration that he was no longer a Muslim in the Kuala Lumpur High Court. The court 
dismissed his application on the grounds that the subject matter in the application fell 
within the jurisdiction of  the Syariah Courts. In Kamariah bte Ali v. Kelantan Government 
(2002) 3 MLJ 657, a cult member was sentenced to two years in jail for apostasy. There 
is also the case of  Siti Fatimah Tan Abdullah v. Majlis Agama Islam Pulau Pinang (2006) 
Case. 07100-043-0191-2006 (Syariah High Court of  Pulau Pinang), which saw the courts 
exercising some degree of  leniency in allowing the appellant, who converted to Islam to 
marry an Iranian, to later renounce the religion. 
However, it was Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Another, (2007) 4 MLJ 585, 
that has gained international attention and widespread local debate (Evans, 2009: 460). Joy 
argued that the National Registry Department’s (NRD’s) requirement of  a Syariah court’s 
confirmation of  her conversion violated her constitutional right to freedom of  religion. 
The Federal Court, however, upheld the NRD’s requirement before Joy could officially 
change her religious status on her identity card. The majority opinion also held that one can 
renounce Islam but still must follow Islam’s procedure to do so, and agreed with 
submissions of  various Muslim Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that willful 
and whimsical conversions could cause chaos to Islam and its adherents (Evans, 2009: 
463-464). Although this case was largely an administrative law matter, it became rife with 
important constitutional and human rights questions.
First, if  rights provisions are indeed a mechanism for preventing State interference with 
a citizen’s fundamental liberties, Joy’s argument is plausible. Civil and political rights, 
such as religious freedom, are of  a negative nature, that is, the State simply must not 
encroach upon a citizen’s exercise of  those rights. Second, the fact that the majority 
required adherence to particular procedures for renouncing Islam (namely, a Syariah court 
confirmation), suggests that Article 11 is read in light of  Article 3 (Evans, 2009: 464). 
Harding (2010: 511) argues that the ruling essentially “elevated article 3 to a higher status 
than article 11.” Perhaps one could entertain the idea that Islam as the religion of  the 
Federation means that it should be given precedence, and that any exercise of  religious 
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freedom by Muslims is conditional on Article 3. However, this approach is sorely lacking 
of  any constitutional basis because Article 3(4) clearly states that the establishment of  
Islam does not affect other provisions of  the Constitution. The majority holding in Lina 
Joy also appears to betray the constitutional guarantee of  equality regardless of  race or 
religion.
Perhaps the most problematic aspect of  the decision is the apparent side-stepping of  
constitutional issues and deference to the Syariah court in matters implicating freedom 
of  religion. It reveals a lacuna in the legal system due to overlapping of  civil and Syariah 
jurisdictions. On the one hand, constitutional rights and interpretation fall squarely 
within the purview of  the civil courts. Harding argues that matters within the Islamic 
jurisdiction are personal rather than constitutional, and that the “constitutional law 
requires that jurisdiction of  the ordinary courts to rule finally on matters of  legality 
should be preserved” (Harding, 1996: 138). On the other hand, conversions out of  
Islam are perceived as a matter for the Syariah courts due to the separation of  the civil-
Syariah jurisdiction in 1988. The problem is that state-enacted Islamic laws regulating 
conversions are not always consistent with religious freedom. Moreover, barring a few 
states, there is no clear legislative enactment on how to deal with apostates or those who 
seek to convert (Hasan, 2008). It is also unlikely that individuals would voluntarily go 
to the Syariah courts to convert because these efforts may either be futile, or they will 
be subjected to punishment or counseling sessions. For instance, Articles 119(1) and 
119(8) of  the Administration of  Islam Enactment (Negeri Sembilan) 2003 require an 
individual to first to apply to a Syariah court for a declaration that he or she is no longer 
a Muslim, attend counseling for a year, and if  his or her position does not change, the 
court may grant the application. Constitutional arguments aside, it is worth mentioning 
that from an Islamic perspective, apostasy (for instance by pronouncing oneself  to have 
or intend to renounce Islam) is considered valid regardless of  its official endorsement by 
any particular authority (Abidin, 2007).
The outcome of  Lina Joy restricts freedom of  religion and, to a certain extent, puts it in 
a state of  flux. There is no clear answer to whether the Federal Court would be willing 
to fight tooth and nail to uphold Article 11 and permit conversions among Muslims. 
The trend of  side-stepping issues of  constitutional importance and obscuring the 
boundaries of  religious freedom in Malaysia continued in a recent child conversion case, 
Shamala Sathiyaseelan v Dr Jeyaganesh C Mogarajah & Another (2004) 2 MLJ 648. There, 
the consent of  a single parent is deemed enough to validate the conversion of  a child. 
There, a Hindu woman appealed against a High Court decision affirming the validity of  
her children’s conversion to Islam without her consent. Shamala and her husband were 
both Hindus at the time of  their marriage and her husband later converted to Islam 
and also converted both their minor children. The High Court also ruled that Shamala’s 
application to invalidate the conversion is not within its jurisdiction because the children 
are now Muslims and as such, they are subject to the Syariah jurisdiction.  The High Court 
86
Dian Abdul Hamed Shah 
and Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani
accepted that Shamala, being a non-Muslim, was without remedy as she is not within 
the Syariah jurisdiction. The Court only suggested that Shamala seek assistance from the 
Islamic Council of  the Federal Territories. 
One of  the crucial questions on appeal is whether the Syariah court has exclusive 
jurisdiction to determine the validity of  minors’ conversion to Islam once they have been 
registered as Muslims (Harun, 2010). The Federal Court was also called upon to determine 
the appropriate forum for a non-Muslim parent to assert his or her rights and remedies in 
cases of  unilateral conversion of  children. In November 2010, the Federal Court rejected 
Shamala’s referral application on the basis that Shamala was in contempt of  a High Court 
order requiring her to bring her children to Malaysia. Shamala had apparently left the 
country with her children in 2004 (The Star, 2010). Commentators criticized the Federal 
Court’s apparent ‘hands-off ’ approach as a mere ‘skirting of  technicalities’ (Harun, 2010). 
It appears that the Court had failed to appreciate the gravity of  the constitutional issues 
presented before it, and that it missed the opportunity to clarify those issues, especially as 
there are other similar cases pending (Tan, 2010).
4.2 Minority Religious Doctrines
The extent of  religious freedom in Malaysia is also challenged by restrictions on religious 
doctrines. As the preceding section demonstrates, states reserve the right to restrict or 
control propagation of  any religious doctrines among Muslims. These limitations affect 
both Muslim and non-Muslim communities alike.  
The first implication of  this restriction is that non-Muslims’ freedom to practice their 
religion may be severely curtailed with respect to propagation of  their religion to 
Muslims. There are some State Laws and Federal laws restricting the right to propagate 
any religious doctrine or belief  among Muslims except for Sunni Islam. One example is 
Terengganu’s ‘The Control and Restriction of  the Propagation of  Non-Islamic Religious 
Enactment’ of  1980 (Adil, 2007). In the Federal Territories, Article 5 of  Syariah Criminal 
Offence Act 1997 states:
‘Any person who propagates religious doctrine or belief  other than the religious 
doctrine or beliefs of  the religion of  Islam among persons professing the Islamic 
faith shall be guilty of  an offence and shall on conviction be liable to fine not 
exceeding three thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two 
years or to both’.
As a matter of  constitutional law, these legislations are rightly constitutional by virtue of  
Article 11(4) (Harding, 2002: 167).
Restrictions on propagation may be connected to concerns of  widespread proselytism, 
conversions, and also non-Sunni religious Sects among Sunni Muslims (Harding, 2002: 
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168). While such restrictions interfere with the right to practice a religion, it is often 
taken for granted that proselytism itself  may be deemed a serious encroachment of  
religious freedom. If  this right is to be meaningful, individuals should be free from any 
compulsion or undue influence to adopt a particular belief. Thus, conversion resulting 
from compulsion or undue influence is more problematic than conversion out of  one’s 
free will. In a multiethnic society like Malaysia, the former is potentially divisive and may 
threaten social order. An instructive case is Minister of  Home Affairs & Another v Jamaluddin 
bin Othman (1989) 1 MLJ 418, where an individual was detained under Internal Security 
Act 1960 (“ISA”) for allegedly disseminating Christianity among Malays and converted 
six Malays to Christianity. It was suggested that this could ignite tensions between the 
Christian and Muslim communities and pose a threat to national security. However, the 
Supreme Court (as it then was) held that such detention was unlawful as it was contrary 
to the religious right conferred by Article 11(1). The Minister could not utilize the ISA to 
restrict an individual’s right to profess and practice his religion. The Court also ruled that 
mere participation in meetings and seminars on Christianity, and conversion of  Malays 
could not be regarded as a national security threat.
The second implication from the Article 11(4) restriction is that state laws may prohibit 
the propagation of  other sects or doctrines within Islam itself.  Mohamed Salleh Abas 
(1984: 45) argues that:
‘This limitation is logical as it is necessary consequence that follows naturally from 
the fact that Islam is the religion of  the Federation. Muslims in this country belong 
to the Sunni Sect which recognizes only the teachings of  four specified schools 
of  thought and regards others school of  thought as being contrary to true Islamic 
religion. It is with a view to confining the practice of  Islamic religion in this country 
within the Sunni Sect that State Legislative Assemblies and Parliament as respects 
the Federal Territory are empowered to pass laws to protect Muslims’.
Thus, state laws may prohibit ‘deviations’ from the Sunni sect. Since Muslims in Malaysia 
officially adhere to Sunni teachings, non-Sunni schools of  thought are outlawed (Adil, 
2007: 10-11). Although there is no constitutional provision entrenching the position of  
Sunni teachings among Muslims in Malaysia, certain state enactments such as that of  the 
Federal Territories of  Kuala Lumpur, Labuan and Putrajaya, provides that Muslims must 
conform with Sunni teachings, with emphasis on the Shafi’I school of  thought (Adil, 
2007: 10).
The executive and state religious departments have also been fairly active in crackdowns 
against adherents of  other sects. For example, in the 1990s the Arqam Islamic group, 
formed in the 1960s to promote an ‘Islamic’ way of  life based on self-sufficiency and 
strict adherence to Islamic teachings, faced persecution by the government (Adil, 2007: 
11). In 1994, this group was labeled by the National Fatwa Council as ‘deviant’ and 
unlawful. The Ministry of  Home Affairs also delegitimized Arqam under the Societies 
Act of  1966 (Adil, 2007: 11). 
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Between October 2000 and January 2001, the Federal government detained six Shia 
followers under the ISA. Although they were not charged either in civil or Syariah courts, 
Fatwa committees in the country, including the one at the federal level, issued a fatwa 
labeling the group as “deviant” (Adil, 2007: 10). More recently, authorities detained more 
than 200 Muslim Shiites in Selangor on grounds that the Shia doctrine is a threat to 
national security (Associate Press, 2010). The government claimed that Shia doctrine 
allows for the killing of  Muslims considered as being infidels – i.e., non-Shiite Muslims. 
However, it is not clear if  these threats are true or if  they are in fact serious and imminent 
at all.
5. Analysis: Challenges to Freedom of  Religion in Malaysia
5.1 The Dual Civil-Syariah Jurisdiction: A legal loophole? 
A 1988 constitutional amendment separated the civil and Islamic justice systems through 
Article 121(1A). This provision simply states that the civil courts were to have no 
jurisdiction in matters within the Syariah court’s jurisdiction. Thus, Muslims are subjected 
to Syariah laws in certain matters (as listed in the Ninth Schedule, List II, Item I of  the 
Constitution), and any conduct contrary to Islamic precepts is liable to prosecution. The 
amendment seems fueled with the best intentions, but it now raises serious jurisdictional 
conflicts, as well as tensions within the plural Malaysian community. 
While the amendment is justified, because Syariah is a distinct field that requires expertise 
in Islamic jurisprudence (Faruqi, 2006a), one problem with the separation of  jurisdiction 
is that it did not create an authoritative mechanism to resolve a jurisdictional overlap. 
The Lina Joy case, like other cases implicating Islam and the freedom of  religion, exposes 
a legal lacuna on jurisdictional propriety. Joy’s case for instance, involves the tension 
between one’s constitutional right to religious freedom and separate proceedings under 
the Syariah court to renounce Islam. Which court has the authority to definitively rule 
on the matter? In Lina Joy, dissenting judge Richard Malanjum demonstrates greater 
fidelity to constitutional supremacy, arguing that “civil superior courts should not decline 
jurisdiction by merely citing article 121(1A)”. He also added that Article 121 (1A) “only 
protects the Syariah Court in matters within their jurisdiction, which does not include the 
interpretation of  the provisions of  the Constitution”. 
Another key question is whether the Syariah courts have jurisdiction over matters of  
apostasy, even without legislation granting them the power to do so. It bears reiteration 
that religion is a state matter and List II of  Schedule 9 provides matters – such as the 
administration of  Islamic law – in which states may legislate. In Lina Joy, no Federal 
Territories laws mention how to deal with apostates. Section 46(2)(a) of  the Administration 
of  Islamic Law (Fed. Territories) Act provides that a Syariah High Court in the Federal 
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Territories shall only have criminal jurisdiction to try any offence committed by a Muslim 
and punishable under the Enactment or the Islamic Family Law (Federal Territories) Act 
1984 or under any other written law prescribing offences against precepts of  Islam.
The Syariah Criminal Offences (Federal Territories) Act 1997 Part III (Offenses 
Relating to the Sanctity of  the Religion of  Islam and Its Institution) is silent on apostasy. 
Furthermore, the fact that Joy was no longer a Muslim raises the question of  whether she 
could properly be adjudicated under a Syariah court. 
There are two competing views on the jurisdiction of  Syariah courts. The first is that not 
all Syariah laws apply per se (Sarwar, 2007b). For example, Sarwar (2007b) criticizes the 
“erroneous assumption that ‘unwritten’ (or un-enacted) Syariah law . . . can be applied in 
the Syariah courts.” Put differently, whether a matter falls under the jurisdiction of  Syariah 
courts is essentially up to the laws enacted by State Assemblies (or Parliament in the 
case of  the Federal Territories) (Sarwar, 2007c). This proposition – that state laws must 
expressly confer jurisdiction to the Syariah courts – has found favor in earlier decisions. 
For instance, in Ng Wan Chan v. Majlis Ugama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Anor. (No 
2) (1991) 3 MLJ 487, 489, the court held that “if  State law does not confer on the 
Syariah court any jurisdiction to deal with any matter in the State List, the Syariah court is 
precluded from dealing with the matter. Jurisdiction cannot be derived by implication.” 
Thus, in Lina Joy, the absence of  laws governing apostasy in the Federal Territories 
renders the deference to the Syariah court debatable. 
The other view, one that the majority in Lina Joy has adopted, is that Syariah courts possess 
jurisdiction by implication – that their power is inherent in State List of  Schedule 9. In other 
words, just because State laws do not confer jurisdiction to the Syariah courts to adjudicate 
on apostasy issues, this “does not mean that such issues are to be adjudicated automatically 
by a civil court” (Rahman 1998: 1). Indeed, this approach is evident in a series of  cases be-
fore Lina Joy, such as Md Hakim Lee v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur 
(1998) 1 MLJ. 681, 688-689 (where the court held that “the jurisdiction lies with the Syari-
ah court on its wider jurisdiction over a person professing the religion of  Islam even if  no
express provisions are provided in the Administration of  Islamic Law (Federal Terri-
tories) Act 1993.”) and Soon Singh a/l Bikar Singh v. Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia 
(PERKIM) & Anor. (1999) (where the court held that “since matters on conversion to 
Islam come under the jurisdiction of  the Syariah courts, by implication conversion out 
of  Islam should also fall under the jurisdiction of  the same courts.”) Against this, Judge 
Malanjum argues in Lina Joy that where fundamental rights are implicated, “there must 
be as far as possible be express authorization for curtailment or violation of  fundamental 
freedoms. No court or authority should be easily allowed to have implied powers to cur-
tail rights constitutionally granted.” 
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The first view seems more persuasive, especially in a constitutional democracy like Ma-
laysia. It is quite absurd that un-enacted State laws that are merely implied from the state 
legislative list can thwart a Constitution, which is the supreme law of  the nation. On this 
point, Judge Malanjum argued – and perhaps rightly so – that the State legislative lists of  
power is subordinate to fundamental rights of  the Constitution. The continuous side-
stepping by the civil courts in an area as important as the constitutional right to religious 
freedom renders the issue uncertain. It is also frustrating for citizens who resort to the 
highest court in the land to uphold their rights, only to see their appeals being turned 
down on technicalities.
5.2 International Standards and The ‘Asian values’ Debate 
The international human rights standard on freedom of  thought, conscience and religion 
provision includes one’s right to change his or her religion. Furthermore, “any coercion 
that would impair the right to have or to adopt a religion or belief ” is prohibited, “in-
cluding the use of  threat of  physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or 
non-believers to adhere to their religious beliefs” (UN Human Rights Committee, 1993). 
This is the position of  the Human Rights Committee (HRC) in its general comments to 
Article 18(2) of  the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Although these 
comments are not specifically directed at the UDHR, we can extrapolate these formula-
tions to understand what is envisaged by the universal human rights regime in construing 
the meaning of  religious freedom. After all, the ICCPR is a manifestation of  the UDHR 
in its binding form (although the former is stated in considerably greater detail).
On its face, the Malaysian constitutional provisions on religious freedom compare favo-
rably to international standards (Stahnke and Blitt, 2005: 964-966). But the Constitution’s 
careful omission of  the freedom of  a person to renounce or change his religion or belief  
without punishment (although some argue that this freedom can be implied) raises ques-
tions on the true extent religious freedom in Malaysia. Moreover, in practice, conversion 
does not seem to be an option – at least to Muslims – due to certain state laws imposing 
punishment for apostasy (Masum, 2009: vii-viii). While capital punishments are never 
imposed on apostates in Malaysia, those who convert may be required, by state law, to at-
tend counseling sessions (Hussain, 1999: 132). Even where there is no state law on point, 
such as in Lina Joy, it seems that the exercise of  that right is virtually impossible because 
of  uncertainties within the legal system. 
Another potential friction between Malaysia’s conceptions of  religious freedom with the 
international regime concerns the prohibition against propagation of  any religious doc-
trines among Muslims. This challenges the conventional idea of  religious freedom, at 
least in the view of  the international human rights doctrine. Although the restriction is 
defended on the basis of  protecting social stability (Masum, 2009: iv), it implies some 
form of  discrimination in the practice of  religion, and places other religions at a disad-
vantage vis-à-vis Islam. Moreover, restrictions on propagation of  other Islamic doctrines 
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may be seen as an over-regulation by state authorities seeking to impose their particular 
understanding of  Islam on others. The controls may curtail religionists for whom pros-
elytizing is an integral part of  worship (Masum, 2009: iv). 
In turn, this may affect the freedom to teach and practice one’s religious beliefs. On the 
flip side, the concern with proselytism is that such practices may themselves exceed the 
bounds of  religious freedom, especially when they amount to some form of  coercion 
and undue influence on another to adopt another religion. It is worth mentioning that 
proselytizing is not only an issue in Malaysia; it has also been highlighted as something 
that “could eventually lead to the collapse of  social norms and cultural identities in Af-
rica” (Steiner et al., 2008: 607). 
Nevertheless, the problem with an international checks and balances mechanism in Ma-
laysia is the absence of  any legally binding commitment to international human rights 
obligations. The standing of  UDHR continues to be a matter of  great debate. Although, 
as mentioned above, writers have argued that the UDHR has matured into customary 
international law, it is also not incorrect to insist on the declaratory nature of  UDHR 
which imposes no obligation on states. Malaysia’s reluctance to progress towards a con-
crete international human rights obligation is hardly surprising. During the Mahathir ad-
ministration, there was an obsession with the ‘Asian Values’ doctrine circling within the 
politico-legal atmosphere in Southeast Asia (Freeman, 1996: 354). This doctrine, per-
haps characteristic of  the universalist-relativist tension in the human rights discourse, 
challenges the universal human rights scheme based on Asia’s unique cultural traditions 
(Freeman, 1996: 353). The underlying idea is that preserving social harmony and collec-
tive welfare is more important than upholding a ‘western,’ individualistic notion of  hu-
man rights (Freeman, 1996: 353-355).
However, even among the political elites, there is a lack of  consensus not only on what 
the doctrine means, but also whether it is tenable at all (Freeman, 1996: 353). Indonesia’s 
Foreign Minister, for instance, rejected the idea of  an existing clash between the sup-
posedly ‘western’ universal human rights concept and distinctively ‘Asian’ point of  view 
(Freeman, 1996: 353). On the other hand Donnelly argues that leaders such as Singa-
pore’s Lee Kwan Yew and Malaysia’s Mahathir claim that if  a substantial deviation from 
the common international human rights standard is based on culture, it is legitimately al-
lowed (Donnelly, 2003: 107). The Mahathir model of  ‘Asian Values’ include the elements 
of  strong authority, priority of  community over the individual, and a strong family based 
society (Sani, 2008: 4). 
These concepts are important because they shape the way the government (and to some 
extent, the courts) views the parameters of  religious freedom. The underlying idea is that 
restrictions on religious freedom may be justified in exchange for maintaining social or-
der not only among Malaysia’s multi-religious society, but also within the Muslim commu-
nity itself. It is worth emphasizing that the basic responsibility of  a State is to safeguard 
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and prevent encroachments on the freedom of  religion for all citizens. The problem in 
Malaysia, however, is the over-regulation by the State of  private matters.  For Muslims, 
it seems very odd that ‘personal sins’ such as apostasy become matters between an in-
dividual and the state. Prominent Islamic scholars such as Mohammad Hashim Kamali 
have spoken out against this, arguing that it is not for the state to legislate punishments 
for personal sins (Shah, 2009). 
5.3 The Politics of  Race, Religion, and Social Order
A strong assertion of  the right to religious freedom is bound to attract competing inter-
ests in the multiracial Malaysian society. Thus, any analysis is incomplete without con-
sidering the socio-political and racial dimensions to the freedom of  religion debate.  For 
non-Muslims, freedom of  religion is often taken for granted until various problems are 
brought to the public eye. These include cases implicating spouses and children, such as 
the religion that the children should be raised with. For the Malay-Muslim majority, the 
unease is attributable to the purported ramifications on ethnicity and politics. 
Generally, many Malays are strongly attached to their religion. Hence, any attempt to 
weaken a Malay’s faith may be perceived as an indirect attempt to erode Malay identity 
as well as political power (Faruqi, 2001). Within the Malay community, renouncing Islam 
is perceived as deserting the community because Article 160(2) of  the Constitution 
defines a Malay as one who professes the religion of  Islam (Faruqi, 2001). Furthermore, 
cases of  apostasy strike immediate correlations with proselytism and impressions of  an 
attack against the sanctity of  Islam as the religion of  the Federation. Faruqi (2006b) 
suggested that wide-spread conversion of  Malay-Muslims to other religions will have 
grave implications for the delicate racial balance between the Malay and non-Malay 
communities and may well jeopardize the stability of  the nation.
In Lina Joy, it is evident that social order considerations played a role in the majority 
opinion. The majority alluded to several Muslim NGOs’ assertions that conversion at 
will could cause chaos among Muslims and Islam. However, the Lina Joy decision gave no 
clear guidance on when a ‘public order’ justification would ever be tenable. The majority 
did not explore this issue in great depth and it almost seems as if  the threat to ‘public 
order’ argument is a mere assumption. It is duly accepted that the Constitution provides 
that the freedom of  religion does not authorize any acts contrary to any general law relat-
ing to public order, public health or morality. Even from an international human rights 
perspective, there is no doubt that the freedom of  religion is not absolute. However, 
where derogations are permitted on the basis of  public order, this affects only manifes-
tations of  belief  and not the freedom to adopt or profess a belief  (UN Human Rights 
Committee, 1993).
To some, though indirect, extent, the rise of  political Islam has some bearing on how 
most Malay-Muslims view religion and the expectations on the status of  Islam in the 
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country (Harding, 2010: 502-503). Although Islam’s role was initially thought as merely 
ceremonial, the resurgence of  Islam in Malaysia’s political landscape in the 1970s and 
1980s arguably changed this. The Islamic Party, PAS, who vowed to establish an Islamic 
state where only Muslims would hold political power, subsequently took over the state of  
Kelantan (Harding, 2010: 502). In response to the change in political climate, the ruling 
Barisan Nasional (“BN”) multiethnic coalition launched various Islamization initiatives in 
the legal and institutional sectors, as well as in education (Harding, 2010: 503). Although 
government policies leaned towards Islamic values, PAS gained noteworthy electoral 
successes which then put the federal government under pressure (Harding, 2010: 504-
506). These events helped shape the emergence of  the “Islamic State” rhetoric. As 
Harding (2010: 506) observes:
‘The electoral successes of  PAS created a new environment for the discussion 
of  the role of  Islamic law. Beginning around 1999, for example, there was public 
debate about the concept of  an Islamic state, which intensified and broadened 
following an announcement by the Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad in 
Parliament that Malaysia was an ‘Islamic state’. Dr Mahathir even went so far as to 
say that Malaysia was a ‘fundamentalist, not a moderate Islamic state’, and that it 
was also a ‘model Islamic state’.
The language of  ‘social order,’ often cited to curtail rights, is not a uniquely Malaysian 
concept. However, the more important question is where do we draw the line between 
maintaining social stability and securing individual rights of  religious practice and 
freedom of  religion? This needs to be re-evaluated in Malaysia where the politicization of  
the “Islamic State” identity and fear-mongering has had a considerable effect on defining 
the parameters of  fundamental rights afforded by the Constitution. The restrictions on 
rights of  others due to mere political insecurity cannot be tolerated if  we are to uphold 
both human rights and respect for religious convictions.
5.4 Bridging Universalist-Relativist Debate
Malaysia’s experience with freedom of  religion is demonstrative the tension between the 
universal ideals of  human rights and the relativity of  cultural and religious norms. The former 
resists religious traditions that are arguably at odds with the modern liberal interpretation of  
universal human rights principles (Mohamad, 2008: 155), while the latter is often advanced 
on the basis of  ‘social order’ and the desire to maintain distinct ‘Asian Values.’  But the 
exposé on the Malaysian practices suggests that there are also other unresolved questions. 
Any firm reconciliation with international human rights standards remains problematic, 
and local institutional and political obstacles to the exercise of  religious freedom 
complicate this.
In attempting to bridge the universalist-relativist gap, one should first note that the two polar 
assumptions of  human rights “would have been foreign to the framers of  the Declaration” 
(Glendon, 2008: 142). Moreover, the final Vienna Document that all UN members have 
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accepted stresses that it is the participating States’ duty to implement human rights while 
bearing in mind that countries have different religious and cultural traditions (Glendon, 
2008: 142). Nevertheless the challenge to resolve the gap in the context of  religious freedom 
lies not only in the tension between religious and secular spheres, but also in the relationship 
of  religion to other rights (Danchin, 2009: 102) as well as of  one religion vis-a-vis another 
(An-Naim, 2000: 95).
Another problem plaguing the human rights discourse is the failure to appreciate the 
human rights canon as a whole. Hence, there lies an obstacle in properly conceiving 
morality of  human rights when construing the freedom of  religion. In resolving this 
problem one should look at the UDHR’s call for everyone to “act in the spirit of  
brotherhood” as a starting point for refuting claims that the human rights regime is 
inherently individualistic and discriminatory against non-Western cultures. One must 
remember that the human rights corpus, in its quest for a truly universal acceptance, 
accommodates varying circumstances through its limitation clause. 
The freedom of  thought, conscience, and religion must also be considered together 
with Article 29, which emphasizes that “everyone has duties to the community.” Quite 
interestingly, the UDHR is silent on the meaning, origin and enumeration of  such 
duties (Khalil, 2010: 8), so much so that this is open to interpretation and incorporation 
according to varying culture and religious norms. Steiner et al. (2008: 347-8) argue that 
“the ambit of  human duties is wide; encompassing all dimensions of  man’s life, be they 
physical, spiritual and mental.” 
If  one pays attention to the UDHR as a whole, then human duties should not be blatantly 
ignored when one speaks of  human rights. Indeed, religious beliefs and human rights 
are deemed complementary expressions of  similar ideas, although religion invokes the 
language of  duties rather than rights (Steiner et al., 2008: 569). One problem, however, 
is that some religious duties may impinge on rights, and religious authorities routinely 
assert primacy of  those traditions over certain rights (Steiner et al., 2008: 569). This is 
more challenging when that assertion is grounded upon highly conservative, counter-
progressive conceptions of  religion. Furthermore, religions are chiefly concerned with 
the rights of  their constituents, including in exercising the right to freedom of  thought, 
conscience, and religion (Henkin, 1998: 234). So the question becomes: do rights come 
first, or duties?  It is problematic for human rights to be strictly defined by duties, or vice 
versa. Religious duties, in the Islamic context for example, offer different opinions on 
the extent of  religious freedom, especially in cases of  conversions and apostasy. More 
problematic is the differing implementation of  religious laws in various countries, and 
respective claims of  superiority by different religions. The human rights canon, as general 
secular construct, did not provide for these intricate contingencies.
Perhaps the ultimate resolution lies in focusing on the human rights morality, which is 
grounded upon the notion of  human dignity – that all human beings are born free and 
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equal. This not only means that one’s fundamental rights must be respected in spirit and 
essence, but it also denotes respect for the exercise of  rights by others. It is indeed moral 
to respect individual rights, the exercise of  which is essential not only for one to develop as 
a person, but also to contribute to collective development because individuals are in fact, 
part and parcel of  a community. Thus, human duties to the community must be carried 
out concurrently with assertions of  human rights as far as those duties are compatible 
with human dignity and the human rights ideal of  respecting individual beliefs. This 
ideal exists “where the government does not prescribe orthodoxy or prohibit particular 
religions or beliefs” (Shelton and Kiss, 2007: 575). In the religious freedom context, it 
is consistent with human rights morality to respect one’s independent choice of  belief. 
Human duties to community should be allowed to run their course by providing room 
for discussion and resolution. But if  such a process is ultimately futile, then the dignity 
of  individual choice should be respected without unnecessary, State-imposed hurdles.
6. Conclusion
Religion is an important feature of  the nation by reason of  tradition and history, and it 
will continue to be important in the social, political and legal discourse. The relationship 
between law and religion is a complex, albeit evolving issue.
The foregoing sections demonstrate that not only is the Malaysian practice complicated 
from a constitutional perspective, but that it also raises serious questions in light of  the 
human rights regime on religious freedom. If, as previously suggested, the Lina Joy out-
come will “define the nation’s character” (Prystay, 2006: 11), then the plural Malaysian 
society has a lot to cringe about.
It seems that discussions on Islam as the religion of  the Federation and religious freedom 
fail to consider the Constitution in its entirety, much less pay attention to the intention 
of  our forefathers in engineering the Constitution. The resolution of  cases implicating 
freedom of  religion does not seem to be conducive to maintaining religious harmony 
and pluralism in a divided society. The constitutional promise of  religious freedom and 
equality, rosy as they may seem, are being eroded. Various political and social concerns, 
and unyielding insistence on ‘Asian values’ further complicate increase this issue. 
The arguments above also have one thing in common – foregrounding the interests in 
morality, humanity, and social stability. While we remain cognizant of  local conditions and 
allow society to evolve its human rights consciousness through education and advocacy, 
courts also bear an important responsibility in defining the parameters of  citizens’ rights. 
Furthermore, although human rights are secular and Western in origin, the UDHR is 
a document of  persuasive moral authority. The morality stemming from respect for 
individual rights is important as the exercise of  those rights will bear significant impact 
on community living and social order. It is also notable that duties to the community 
can be arbitrary or an exclusive matter for domestic law and politics (Opsahl, 1992: 457-
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458). We should be mindful of  this because authorities have an interest in imposing rules 
that arguably violate individual rights to buttress their position and maintain the status 
quo. For that reason, there must be solid recognition of  human rights as a mechanism 
of  checks and balances against the state. In the context of  freedom of  religion, the 
responsibility of  a State to safeguard and prevent encroachments on this fundamental 
right is paramount.
A strong grounding on values, through both human rights and duties to the community, 
is the key to tolerance and social stability. There is an urgent need for a more receptive 
approach towards common morality that can be derived from both Universalist and 
Relativist conceptions of  human rights. Instead of  getting bogged down in ideological 
antagonisms and arrogant dismissals, freedom of  religion has to be understood in the 
proper context in order to promote progressive reconciliation with religious precepts. 
For one to believe that the other has the right to practice their faith freely, the conviction 
must begin from the firm morality of  respecting human dignity and beliefs. Religious 
issues in a plural society such as Malaysia must also be open to debates by all sections 
of  the community. Sensitivities can only be resolved through civilized deliberation and 
decisions motivated by consensus and compromise. While concerns of  social stability are 
understandable, actions must not compromise human dignity. 
With the increasing human rights consciousness and growing number of  progressives 
among both the Malay-Muslim majority and other minorities, we can hope for a shift in 
mentality and a more civilized rights discourse in Malaysia.
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